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Abstract
This paper investigates the environment tax and trade liberalization with different market
structures (pure oligopoly or mixed oligopoly) juxtaposing the substitutability of the goods
(homogenous goods and differentiated goods), wherein environmental damage is associated
with consumption. It shows that the environmental tax in mixed oligopoly is higher than in
pure oligopoly irrespective of the properties of goods. In addition, it demonstrates that when
the domestic market increases its openings, the tariff reduction does not always bring positive
effects on the environment in mixed oligopoly; but, in pure oligopoly with homogeneous
goods, the tariff reduction is bad for the environment.
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1. Introduction 
 
Controlling pollution emission has become the most important and pressing issue for 
most governments to deal with. In particular, many developing countries face the alternatives 
between poor environmental-quality improvement and development of the economy. With 
market opening, the impact of trade liberalization on the environment has become the focus 
of much attention and debate. Many existing studies are concerned about internalizing 
pollution externalities by using environmental tax like Krutilla (1991) who has focused 
attention on the determination of environmental regulations, and disregard the effect of trade 
liberalization on pollution control.   
Few studies have considered negative externalities associated with consumption of the 
good such as gum-chewing, cigarette smoking and gasoline consumption that cause 
environmental damage. Anderson (1992) showed that liberalizing trade in a good whose 
consumption gives rise to pollution will cause a country’s environment to deteriorate if the 
good is imported. Metcalfe and Beghin (1998) argued that when pollution intensities emitted 
in consumption endogenously respond to environmental policy, and when this policy differs 
between trading partners, an additional policy instrument is required to cap pollution 
intensities, such as a standard or a prohibitive tax on any increase in the intensity of 
consumption pollution.   
Lai (2004) examined trade and environmental policies in a pure duopoly market, while 
Ohori (2006) extended Lai’s work in a mixed duopoly model and showed that the optimal 
environmental tax in a mixed duopoly is higher than the Pigouvian level and the optimal tax 
in a pure duopoly. Furthermore, Lai and Hu (2005) demonstrated that trade liberalization will 
enhance global welfare if transboundary pollution-associated consumption is sufficiently 
strong as well as if bilateral reduction in tariffs is beneficial to the global environment. 
In this paper, we investigate the optimal environmental tax and the environmental effect 
of trade liberalization in a mixed oligopoly and pure oligopoly, wherein firms produce the 
differentiated goods and the environmental damage is associated with consumption.
1 As  a 
benchmark, we used the study conducted by Lai (2004), who demonstrates that trade 
liberalization on “dirty” goods leads to environmental improvement and Ohori (2006), who 
demonstrates that trade liberalization on such dirty goods has no influence on environmental 
improvement. We then compared the environmental tax before privatization with that after 
privatization, and that of producing differentiated goods with homogeneous goods. We found 
that when the domestic market increases its openings, the tariff reduction does not always 
bring positive effects on the environment in mixed oligopoly; but, in pure oligopoly with 
homogeneous goods, the tariff reduction is bad for the environment. 
                                                 
1  Mixed oligopoly models with foreign competition, see Fjell and Pal (1996), Pal and White (1998), and Fjell 
and Heywood (2002)   2
  This paper is organized as follows. Section 2 provides the basic model. Section 3 
includes the results of the analysis in oligopoly with differentiated goods and does a 
comparison. Section 4 analyzes the effects of trade liberalization. Section 5 presents 
concluding remarks. 
 
2. The Model 
 
The model follows Ohori’s (2006) basic set-up but includes product differentiation. 
Consider a single international market in which there exists one domestic firm (firm 0) and 
several private foreign firms (firmi, 1,..., in = ) competing in a domestic country. Under the 
Cournot-Nash assumption, if the domestic firm is public, it selects its output in order to 
maximize the sum of consumer surplus and its own profit  U ；if the domestic firm is private, 
it chooses its output in order to maximize its own profit  0 π . The domestic and foreign firms 
produce a differentiated good, given by  i q (i=0, 1… n), and this leads to pollution. The 
domestic government sets the environmental tax  t  to control the pollution that results from 
environmentally harmful consumption. We assume that all consumers in the domestic country 
are the same, and normalize the size of the population in the domestic country to one. The 
representative consumer derives utility from consuming the good under consideration, and 
suffers from consumption-type pollution. The utility function of the representative consumer 
in the domestic country is as follows Häckner (2000) in generalizing the utility function to 
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Where  I   is the composite goods, and  θ   is the coefficient of the marginal pollution 
damage. By solving the optimization problem of the domestic consumer, we can derive the 







=+ ∑ .  Q 
denotes the aggregate output. We assume 0 p′< . In order to sharpen the study, it is also 
assumed that the inverse demand function is linear (i.e. ( ) p Qa Q = − ). The profit function of 
firm 0, 
00 0 () p ct q π =− − , 
where  0 c   is the constant marginal production cost. 
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The environmental damage function is given byDQ θ = , where  θ   denotes the marginal 
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The foreign private firm selects its own output in order to maximize its profit, 
() ifi p ct q π τ =−− − ,  1,2,......, in = ,  (4) 
where  f c   is the constant marginal production cost and  τ   is the tariff rate, 0 τ ≥ .When we 
examine the duopoly case, in equation (2)、(3) and (4) assuming  1 n =   to represent one 
foreign firm. For simplicity, each firm does not have fixed cost. It also assumes that the 
marginal production cost of the domestic firm is higher than that of the foreign firm 
( 0 0 f cc >> ).
2  Moreover, as in Lai and Ohori, we consider trade liberalization to be a form 
of tariff reduction. 
 
3. Environmental Tax in Oligopoly 
 
We extend the basic model concerning the number of foreign firms in which there is one 
domestic firm and  n  foreign private firms producing differentiated goods.   
 
3.1 Pure Oligopoly   
We first derive the optimal environmental tax in the pure oligopoly with differentiated 
goods. Under the Cournot-Nash assumption, the domestic private firm selects its output in 
order to maximize its own profit 0 π , while the foreign private firm chooses its output in order 
to maximize its own profit i π . We obtain the following first-order conditions: 
00 0 pc tp q ′ −− + = , and  (5) 
0 fi pc t pq τ γ ′ −− − + = , 1,2,......, in = .  (6) 
The output effects of the taxes are obtained by differentiating (5) and (6) with respect to 
t and  i q ,  0 1( 2 ) qt n p δ δ ′ =+ and 
1




qtnn p δδ γ
=
′ =+ ∑ . This demonstrates that an 
increase in the environmental tax reduces the market share of all firms. Having obtained these 
results, we differentiate social welfare equation with respect to  t and  set  /0 dW dt =  to 
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where 
* Q   denotes optimal aggregate output
3. 
                                                 
2  See Cremer et al (1989) for a justification of this assumption. 
3  (a) We use the superscripts  M 、P、DM and  DP  for the mixed Cournot-Nash with homogeneous goods,   4
3.2 Mixed Oligopoly   
We derive the optimal environmental tax in the mixed oligopoly with differentiated 
goods. Under the Cournot-Nash assumption, the domestic firm selects its output in order to 
maximize the sum of consumer surplus and its own profitsU , while the foreign private firm 
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0 fi pc t pq τ γ ′ −− − + = , 1,2,......, in = .  (9) 
The output effects of the taxes are obtained by differentiating (8) and (9) with respect to 
t and  i q , 
'








= ∑ . These demonstrate that an increase in the 
environmental tax reduces the market share of the less efficient public firm. Having obtained 
these results, we differentiate social welfare equation with respect to  t and  set  /0 dW dt =  
to obtain optimal environmental tax, 
0 ()
1








.  (10) 
From equation (7) 、 (10) 、 (A.1.4) and (A.2.4)
4, we find that the optimal environmental tax 
in different market with different properties of goods is, 
M DM P DP tt tt => > .   
We have the following proposition. 
Proposition 1: In an international oligopoly market wherein the environmental damage 
is associated with consumption, the order of optimal environmental tax parallels the results 
of the duopoly model.   
     
4. The Effects of Trade Liberalization 
 
We now consider the impact of a change in the tariff rate on the outputs of one domestic 
firm and  n  foreign private firms in the domestic market. We derive the total impact of trade 
liberalization on the environment by differentiating the environmental damage function with 
respect toτ , 
0
dD D D t
dt
δ δδ
τδ τδ δ τ
=+ = . 
                                                                                                                                                        
pure Cournot-Nash homogeneous goods, mixed Cournot-Nash with differentiated goods, and pure 
Cournot-Nash with differentiated goods  oligopoly  respectively.   
(b) Because the form of optimal environmental tax in pure duopoly is not as usual, there exists a 
'* pQ  term. 
Therefore, we supply a special case to simplify this equation in appendix B. 
4  See appendix A. for deriving optimal tax rate in pure and mixed oligopoly homogeneous goods.   5
We obtained the following four results for different market structures and commodities 
properties: 
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Case (iii): pure oligopoly with differentiated goods 
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According to the above results, we know no matter what types of market structures, 
there is a negative relationship between tariff rate  τ   and environmental taxes  t; that is, if 
the government opens the market wholly to make the numbers of foreign firms increase from 
1 ton, it may cause more pollution; hence, the government should raise the environmental 
t a x .                    
In pure oligopoly with homogeneous goods, if the numbers of firms are equal and less 
than two (i.e. 2 n ≤ ), a tariff reduction will improve the environment；however, if the numbers 
of firms are equal and greater than three (i.e. 3 n ≥ ), a tariff reduction has harmful effect on 
the environment. In mixed oligopoly with homogeneous goods, a tariff reduction has no   6
effect on the environmental damage associated with consumption, which is the same as 
Ohori’s (2006) result. However, in the pure oligopoly with differentiated goods, a tariff 
reduction has a positive impact on the environment; but, in mixed oligopoly with 
differentiated goods, a tariff reduction has harmful effect on the environment. When 
exogenous variables  n or γ   equal 1, we obtain the same results as in the duopoly market 
(Lai and Ohori’s work). We have the following proposition. 
Proposition 2: The effects of trade liberalization in oligopoly coincide with that in 
duopoly; except for the one in pure oligopoly with homogeneous goods. When the domestic 
market increases its openings, the tariff reduction does not always bring positive effects on 
the environment in mixed oligopoly; but, in pure oligopoly with homogeneous goods, the 
tariff reduction is bad for the environment. 
 
5. Concluding Remarks 
 
Using the simple linear demand model, part of our findings are consistent with what has 
been shown in Lai (2004) and Ohori (2006), even though they considered all firms producing 
homogeneous goods. In an international oligopoly market wherein the environmental damage 
is associated with consumption, the order of optimal environmental tax parallels the results of 
the duopoly model irrespective of the properties of the goods. In addition, we have shown 
that when the domestic market increases its openings, the tariff reduction does not always 
bring positive effects on the environment in mixed oligopoly; but, in pure oligopoly with 
homogeneous goods, the tariff reduction is bad for the environment.   7
Appendix A 
A.1 Pure Oligopoly with Homogeneous Goods 
Under the Cournot-Nash assumption, we obtain the following first-order conditions, 
00 0 pc tp q ′ −− + = , and  (A.1.1) 
0 fi pc t p q τ ′ −− − + = , 1,2,......, in = .  (A.1.2) 
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A.2 Mixed Oligopoly with Homogeneous Goods 
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The optimal environmental tax, 
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The optimal environmental tax is  
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If all firms produce homogeneous goods, let 1 τ = , the optimal output and 
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